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Abstract. The success of Conflict Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) for
Boolean satisfiability has inspired adoption in other domains. We present
a novel lifting of CDCL to program analysis called Abstract Conflict
Driven Learning for Programs (ACDLP). ACDLP alternates between
model search, which performs over-approximate deduction with constraint
propagation, and conflict analysis, which performs under-approximate
abduction with heuristic choice. We instantiate the model search and
conflict analysis algorithms to an abstract domain of template polyhedra,
strictly generalizing CDCL from the Boolean lattice to a richer lattice
structure. Our template polyhedra can express intervals, octagons and
restricted polyhedral constraints over program variables. We have imple-
mented ACDLP for automatic bounded safety verification of C programs.
We evaluate the performance of our analyser by comparing with CBMC,
which uses CDCL, and Astre´e, a commercial abstract interpretation tool.
We observe two orders of magnitude reduction in the number of deci-
sions, propagations, and conflicts as well as a 1.5x speedup in runtime
compared to CBMC. Compared to Astre´e, ACDLP solves twice as many
benchmarks and has much higher precision. This is the first instantiation
of CDCL with a template polyhedra abstract domain.
1 Introduction
Static program analysis with abstract interpretation [12] is widely used to verify
properties of safety-critical systems. Static analyses commonly aim to compute
program invariants as fixed-points of abstract transformers. Abstract states are
chosen from a lattice that has meet (⊓) and join (⊔) operations; the meet pre-
cisely models set intersection (or conjunction, taking a logical view), and the join
over-approximates set union (or disjunction). Over-approximation in the join op-
eration is one of the sources of precision loss, which causes false alarms. Typical
abstract domains are non-distributive; suppose a and b together represent the
abstract semantics of a program and c represents a set of abstract behaviours
that violate the specification. In a non-distributive domain, (a ⊔ b) ⊓ c can be
strictly less precise than (a ⊓ c) ⊔ (b ⊓ c). This means that in typical abstract
domains, analysing program behaviours separately can improve the precision
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of the analysis. Usual means to address false alarms therefore include not only
the use of richer abstract domains, but also of refinements that delay joins or
perform some form of case-splitting. Such techniques trade off higher precision
against lower efficiency and may be susceptible to case enumeration behaviour.
By contrast, Model Checking (MC) [5] can be seen to operate on distributive
lattice structures that represent disjunction without loss of precision. Classical
MC directly operates on distributive representations, such as BDDs, while more
recent implementations use SAT solvers. SAT solvers themselves operate on par-
tial assignments, which are non-distributive structures. To handle disjunction,
case-splitting is performed [16]. Propositional SAT solvers solve large formulae,
and are often able to avoid enumerating cases. The impressive performance of
modern solvers is credited to well-tuned decision heuristics and sophisticated
clause learning algorithms. Collectively, these algorithms are referred to as Con-
flict Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) [6]. An obvious idea is to lift CDCL from
the domain of partial assignments to other non-distributive domains.
Abstract Conflict Driven Clause Learning (ACDCL) [14] is one such lattice-
based generalization of CDCL. ACDCL is a general algorithmic framework, pa-
rameterized by a concrete domain C and an abstract domain A. Classical CDCL
can be viewed as an instance of ACDCL in which C is the set of propositional
truth assignments and A the domain of propositional partial assignments [18].
Since the concrete domain of interest is a parameter to the framework, ACDCL
can in principle be used to build both logical decision procedures [8] and program
analyzers. In the former case, the concrete domain is the set of candidate models
for the formula; in the latter case, it is the set of program traces that may lead to
an error. Haller et al. in [8] illustrate the first idea by presenting a floating-point
decision procedure that uses interval constraint propagation.
In this paper, we explore the second idea by presenting an extension of
ACDCL to program analysis. We call our framework Abstract Conflict Driven
Learning for Programs (ACDLP). The key insight of ACDLP is to use decisions
and learning to precisely reason about disjunctions in non-distributive domains,
thereby automatically refining the precision of analysis for safety checking of C
programs. We introduce two central components of our framework: an abstract
model search algorithm that uses decisions and propagations to search for coun-
terexample trace and an abstract conflict analysis procedure that approximates
a set of unsafe traces through transformer learning. We illustrate the applica-
tion of our framework to program analysis using a template polyhedra abstract
domain [26], which includes most of the commonly used abstract domains, such
as boxes, octagons, zones and TCMs.
We present an experimental evaluation of our analyser compared to CBMC [10],
which uses propositional solvers, and to Astre´e [7], a commercial abstract inter-
pretation tool. In this paper, we make the following contributions.
1. A novel program analysis framework that lifts model search and conflict
analysis procedures of CDCL algorithm over a template polyhedra abstract
domain. These techniques are embodied in our tool, ACDLP, for automatic
bounded safety verification of C programs.
2. A parameterized abstract transformer that guides the model search in for-
ward, backward and multi-way direction for counterexample detection.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 3
Control-Flow Graph Interval Analysis in ACDLP Octagon Analysis in ACDLP
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Fig. 1. CFG and corresponding Abstract Conflict Graphs for Interval and Octagon
Analysis
3. A conflict analysis procedure that performs UIP-based transformer learning
over template polyhedra abstract domain through abductive reasoning.
2 Motivating Examples
In this section, we present two simple examples to demonstrate the core idea
of ACDLP for bounded verification. For each example, we apply three analy-
sis techniques: abstract interpretation (AI), SAT-based bounded model checking
(BMC) and ACDLP.
First Example The simple Control-Flow Graph (CFG) in Fig. 1 squares a
machine integer and checks that the result is positive. To avoid overflow, we
assume the input v has an upper bound N. This example demonstrates that a)
interval analysis in ACDLP is more precise than a forward AI in the interval
domain, and b) ACDLP with intervals can achieve a precision similar to that
of AI with octagons without employing more sophisticated mechanisms such as
trace partitioning [25].
AI versus ACDLP Conventional forward interval AI is too imprecise to verify
safety of this program owing to the control-flow join at node n4. For example,
the state-of-the-art AI tool Astre´e requires external hints, provided by manually
annotating the code with partition directives at n1. This tells Astre´e to analyse
the program paths separately.
However, ACDLP can be understood as an algorithm to automatically infer
such partitions. For the example in Fig. 1, interval analysis with ACDLP is
sufficient to prove safety. The analysis records the decisions and deductions in a
trail data-structure. The trail can be viewed to represent a graph structure called
the Abstract Conflict Graph (ACG) that stores dependencies between decisions
and deductions nodes, similar to the way an Implication Graph [6] works in a
SAT solver. Nodes of the ACG in the second column of Fig. 1 are labelled with
the CFG location and the corresponding abstract value. Beginning with the
assumption that v=[0,5] at node n1, the intervals generated by forward analysis
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Control-Flow Graph Octagon Analysis in ACDLP
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Fig. 2. CFG and corresponding Abstract Conflict Graphs for Octagon Analysis
in the initial deduction phase at decision level 0 (DL0) are x = [−5, 5] and
z = [−25, 25]. Clearly these do not prove safety, as shown in ACG1. ACDLP
therefore makes a heuristic decision, at DL1, to refine the analysis. With the
decision c = [1, 1], interval analysis then concludes x = [0, 5] at node n4, which
leads to (Error: ⊥) in ACG2, indicating that the error location is unreachable
and that the program is safe when c = [1, 1].
Reaching (Error: ⊥) is analogous to reaching a conflict in a propositional
SAT solver. At this point, a clause-learning SAT solver learns a reason for the
conflict and backtracks to a level such that the learnt clause is unit. By a similar
process, ACDLP learns that c = [0, 0]. That is, all error traces must satisfy
(c 6= 1). The analysis discards all interval constraints that lead to the conflict
and backtracks to DL0. ACDLP then performs interval analysis with the learnt
clause (c 6= 1). This also leads to a conflict, as shown in ACG3. The analysis
cannot backtrack further and so terminates, proving the program safe. Thus,
decision and clause learning are used to infer the partitions necessary for a precise
analysis. Alternatively, the octagon analysis in ACDLP—illustrated in the third
column of Fig. 1—can prove safety with propagations only. No decisions are
required. Forward AI with octagons in Astre´e is also able to prove safety.
Solver Domains decisions propagations conflicts conflict literals restarts
Solver statistics for Fig. 1 (For N = 46000)
MiniSAT BVars → {t, f, ?} 233 36436 162 2604 2
ACDLP nodes → Itvs [NVars ] 1 17 1 1 0
ACDLP nodes → Octs [NVars ] 0 7 0 0 0
Solver statistics for Fig. 2
MiniSAT BVars → {t, f, ?} 4844 32414 570 4750 5
ACDLP nodes → Octs [NVars ] 4 412 2 2 0
Table 1. SAT-based BMC versus ACDLP for verification of programs in Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2
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Second Example Fig. 2, demonstrates that octagon analysis in ACDLP is more
precise than forward AI in the octagon domain. The CFG in Fig. 2 computes the
absolute values of two variables, x and y, under the assumption (x = y) ∨ (x =
−y).
AI versus ACDLP Forward AI in the octagon domain infers the octagonal con-
straint Error: (p ≥ 0∧p+q ≥ 0∧q ≥ 0∧p+x ≥ 0∧p−x ≥ 0∧q+y ≥ 0∧q−y ≥ 0).
Clearly this is too imprecise to prove safety. The octagonal analysis in ACDLP
is illustrated by the ACGs in Fig. 2. Due to space limitations, we elide interme-
diate deductions with dotted lines. The decision x = y at DL1 is not sufficient
to prove safety, as shown in ACG1. Hence, a new decision x < 0 is made at DL2,
followed by forward propagation that infers y < 0 at node n5. This subsequently
leads to safety (Error: ⊥), as shown in ACG2. The analysis learns the reason for
the conflict, discards all deductions in ACG2 and backtracks to DL1. Octagon
analysis is run with the learnt constraint (x ≥ 0) and this infers y ≥ 0 at node n5,
as shown in ACG3. This also leads to safety (Error: ⊥). The analysis now makes
a new decision x = −y at DL1. The procedure is repeated leading to results
shown in ACG4, ACG5, and ACG6. Clearly, the decisions x = −y and x < 0
also lead to safety. The analysis backtracks to DL0 and returns safe. Note that
the specific decision heuristic we use in this case exploits the control structure
of the program to infer partitions that are sufficient to prove safety.
ACDLP versus BMC ACDLP can require many fewer iterations than SAT-
based BMC due to its ability to reason over much richer lattice structures. A SAT-
based BMC converts the program into a bit-vector equation and passes that to
a CDCL-based SAT solver for proving safety. Table 1 compares the statistics
for BMC with MiniSAT [1] solver to those for interval and octagon analysis in
ACDLP. In the column labelled Domains, BVars is the set of propositional vari-
ables; each of these is mapped to true (t), false (f) or unknown (?). NVars is
the set of numerical variables, nodes the set of nodes in the CFG; Itvs [NVars]
and Octs[NVars ] are the Interval and Octagon domains over NVars. As can be
seen, ACDLP outperforms BMC in the total number of decisions, propagations,
learnt clauses and restarts for both example programs.
3 Program Model and Abstract Domain
3.1 Program Representation
We consider bounded programs with safety properties given as a set of assertions,
Assn, in the program. A bounded program is obtained by a transformation that
unfolds loops and recursions a finite number of times. The result is represented
by a set Σ = Prog∪{¬
∧
a∈Assn a}, where Prog contains an encoding of the state-
ments in the program as constraints, obtained after translating the program into
single static assignment (SSA) form via a data flow analysis. The representation
Σ for the program in Fig. 1 is
{g0 = (0 ≤ v ≤ N), g1 = (g0 ∧ c), x0 = v, x1 = −v,
x2 = g1?x0 : x1, g2 = (g1 ∨ g0 ∧ ¬c), z = x2·x2, g2 ∧ z<0}
(1)
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Interval Octagons Zones Equality Fixed-coef. Polyhedra
a ≤ xi ≤ b ±xi ± xj ≤ d xi − xj ≤ d xi = xj a1x1 + . . .+ anxn ≤ d
Table 2. Template instances in the template polyhedra domain
Assignments such as x:=v become equalities x1 = v, where the left-hand side
variable gets a subscripted fresh name. Control flow is encoded using guard
variables, e.g. g1 = g0 ∧ c. Data flow joins become conditional expressions,
e.g. x3 = g1?x1 : x2. The assertions in Assn are constraints such as g2 ⇒ z ≥ 0,
meaning that if g2 holds (i.e., the assertion is reachable) then the assertion must
hold. We write Vars for the set of variables occurring in Σ. Based on the above
program representation, we define a safety formula (ϕ) as the conjunction of
everything in Σ, that is, ϕ :=
∧
σ∈Σ σ. The formula ϕ is unsatisfiable if and only
if the program is safe.
3.2 Abstract Domain
In this paper, we instantiate ACDLP over a reduced product domain [13] D [Vars] =
B|BVars|×TP[NVars] where B is the Boolean domain that permits abstract val-
ues {true, false,⊥,⊤} over boolean variables BVars in the program, and TP is a
template polyhedra [26] domain over the numerical (bitvector) variables NVars.
Our template polyhedra domain can express various relational and non-relational
templates over NVars, as given in Table 2.
Template Polyhedra Abstract Domain An abstract value of the template
polyhedra domain [26] represents a set X of values of the vector x of numerical
(bitvector) variables NVars of their respective data types. (Currently, signed
and unsigned integers are supported.) For example, in the program given by
Eq. (1), we have four numerical variables, written as the vector x = (x0, x1, x2, z).
An abstract value is a constant vector d that represents sets of values for x
for which Cx ≤ d, for a fixed coefficient matrix C. The domain containing
d is augmented by a special element ⊥ to denote the minimal element of the
lattice. There are several optimisation-based techniques [26] for computing the
domain operations, such as meet (⊓) and join (⊔), in the template polyhedra
domain. In our implementation, we use the strategy iteration approach of [9].
The abstraction function is defined by α(X ) = min{d | Cx ≤ d,x ∈ X }, where
min is applied component-wise. The concretisation γ(d) is the set {x | Cx ≤ d}
and γ(⊥) = ∅, i.e., the empty polyhedron.
For notational convenience we will use conjunctions of linear inequalities, for
example x1 ≥ 0 ∧ x1 − z ≤ 30, to write the abstract domain value d =
(
0
30
)
,
with C =
(
−1 0
1 −1
)
and x =
(
x1
z
)
; true corresponds to abstract value ⊤
and false to abstract value ⊥. For a program with N = |NVars| variables, the
template matrix C for the interval domain Itvs [NVars], has 2N rows. Hence, it
generates at most 2N inequalities, one for the upper and lower bounds of each
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variable. For octagons Octs[NVars], we have at most 2N2 inequalities, one for
the upper and lower bounds of each variable and sums and differences for each
pair of variables. Unlike a non-relational domain, a relational domain such as
octagons requires the computation of a closure in order to obtain a normal form,
necessary for precise domain operation. The closure computes all implied domain
constraints. An example of a closure computation for octagonal inequalities is
closure((x − y ≤ 4) ∧ (y − z ≤ 5)) = ((x − y ≤ 4) ∧ (y − z ≤ 5) ∧ (x − z ≤ 9)).
For octagons, closure is the most critical and expensive operator; it has cubic
complexity in the number of program variables. We therefore compute closure
lazily in template polyhedra domain in our abstract model search procedure,
which is described in section 5.3.
Abstract Transformers An abstract transformer JσKD transforms an abstract
value a through a constraint σ; it deduces information from a and σ. The best
transformer is
JσKD (a) = a ⊓ α({u | u ∈ γ(a), u |= σ}) (2)
where we write u |= σ if the concrete value u satisfies the constraint σ. Any
abstract transformer that over-approximates the best abstract transformer is a
sound transformer and can be used in our algorithm. For example, we can deduce
Jx = 2(y+ z)KD(a) = (0 ≤ y ≤ 2∧ 1 ≤ y − z ≤ 1∧−2 ≤ x ≤ 6) for the abstract
value a = (0 ≤ y ≤ 2∧1 ≤ y−z ≤ 1). We denote the set of abstract transformers
for a safety formula ϕ using the abstract domain D by A = {JσKD | σ ∈ Σ}.
3.3 Properties of Abstract Domains
An important property of a clause-learning SAT solver is that each non-singleton
element of the partial assignment domain can be decomposed into a set of pre-
cisely complementable singleton elements [14]. This property of domain elements
is necessary to learn elements that help to guide the model search away from the
conflicting region of the search space. Most numerical abstract domains, such
as intervals and octagons lack complements in general, i.e., not every element
in the domain has a precise complement. However, these domain elements can
be represented as intersections of half-spaces, each of which admits a precise
complement. We formalise this in the sequel.
Definition 1. A meet irreducible m in a complete lattice structure A is an
element with the following property.
∀m1,m2 ∈ A : m1 ⊓m2 = m =⇒ (m = m1 ∨m = m2),m 6= ⊤ (3)
The meet irreducibles in the Boolean domain B for a variable x are x and ¬x.
The meet irreducibles in the template polyhedra domain are all elements that
concretise to half-spaces, i.e., they can be represented by a single inequality. For
the interval domain, these are x ≤ d or x ≥ d for constants d.
Definition 2. A meet decomposition decomp(a) of an abstract element a ∈ D
is a set of meet irreducibles M ⊆ D such that a =
d
m∈M m.
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For polyhedra this intuitively means that each polyhedron can be written as an
intersection of half-spaces. For example, the meet decomposition of the interval
domain element decomp(2 ≤ x ≤ 4 ∧ 3 ≤ y ≤ 5) is the set {x ≥ 2, x ≤ 4, y ≥
3, y ≤ 5}.
Definition 3. An element a ∈ D is called precisely complementable iff there
exists a¯ ∈ D such that ¬γ(a¯) = γ(a). That is, there is an element whose com-
plemented concretisation equals the concretisation of a.
The precise complementation property of a partial assignment lattice can be
generalised to other lattice structures. For example, the precise complement of
a meet irreducible (x ≤ 2) in the interval domain over integers is (x ≥ 3),
or the precise complement of the meet irreducible (x + y ≤ 1) in the octagon
domain over integers is (x+y ≥ 2). Our domain implementation supports precise
complementation operation. However, standard abstract interpretation does not
require a complementation operator. Hence, abstract domain libraries, such as
APRON [20], do not provide it. But it can be implemented with the help of a
meet decomposition as explained above.
4 Abstract Conflict Driven Learning for Programs
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Fig. 3. Architectural View of ACDLP
Figure 3 presents our framework called Abstract Conflict Driven Learning for
Programs that uses abstract model search and abstract conflict analysis proce-
dures for safety verification of C programs. The model search procedure operates
on an over-approximate domain of program traces through repeated application
of abstract deduction transformer, ded , and decisions in order to search for a
counterexample trace. If the model search finds a satisfying assignment (corre-
sponding deduction transformer is γ-complete), then ACDLP terminates with a
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Algorithm 1: Abstract Conflict Driven Learning ACDLPHP ,HD ,HC (A)
input :A program in the form of a set of abstract transformers A.
output :The status safe or unsafe.
1 T ← 〈〉, R← []
2 result ← deduceHP (A,T,R)
3 if result = conflict then return safe
4 while true do
5 if result = sat then return unsafe
6 q ← decideHD (abs(T))
7 T ← T · q
8 R[|T|]← ⊤
9 result ← deduceHP (A,T,R)
10 do
11 if ¬analyzeConflict
HC
(A,T,R) then return safe
12 result ← deduceHP (A,T,R)
13 while result = conflict
14 end
counterexample trace, and the program is unsafe. Else, if a conflict is encoun-
tered, then it implies that the corresponding program trace is either not valid or
safe. ACDLP then moves to the conflict analysis phase where it learns the reason
for the conflict from partial safety proof using an abstract abductive transformer,
abd, followed by a heuristic choice of conflict reason. Similar to a SAT solver,
ACDLP picks one conflict reason from multiple incomparable reasons for conflict
for efficiency reasons. Hence, it operates over an under-approximate domain of
conflict reasons. A conflict reason under-approximates a set of invalid or safe
traces. The conflict analysis returns a learnt transformer (negation of conflict
reason) that over-approximates a set of valid and unsafe traces. Model search is
repeated with this new transformer. Else, if no further backtracking is possible,
then ACDLP terminates and returns safe. We present the ACDLP algorithm in
subsequent section.
The input to ACDLP (Algorithm 1) is a program in the form of a set of
abstract transformers A = {JσKD |σ ∈ Σ} w.r.t. an abstract domain D . Recall
that the safety formula
∧
σ∈Σ σ is unsatisfiable if and only if the program is
safe. The algorithm is parametrised by heuristics for propagation (HP ), decisions
(HD ), and conflict analysis (HC ). The algorithm maintains a propagation trail T
and a reason trail R. The propagation trail stores all meet irreducibles inferred
by the abstract model search phase (deductions and decisions). The reason trail
maps the elements of the propagation trail to the transformers ded ∈ A that
were used to derive them.
Definition 4. The abstract value abs(T) corresponding to the propagation trail
T is the conjunction of the meet irreducibles on the trail: abs(T) =
d
m∈T m with
abs(T) = ⊤ if T is the empty sequence.
The algorithm begins with an empty T, an empty R, and the abstract value ⊤.
The procedure deduce (details in Section 5) computes a greatest fixed-point over
the transformers in A that refines the abstract value, similar to the Boolean
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Algorithm 2: Abstract Model Search deduceHP (A,T,R)
input :A program in the form of a set of abstract transformers A, a
propagation trail T, and a reason trail R.
output : sat or conflict or unknown
1 worklist ← initWorklistHP (A)
2 while !worklist .empty() do
3 dedL ← worklist .pop()
4 a ← dedL(abs(T))
5 if a = ⊥ then
6 R[⊥]← dedL
7 worklist .clear ()
8 return conflict
9 else
10 v = onlyNew(a)
11 T ← T · decomp(v)
12 R[|T|]← dedL
13 updateWorklistHP (worklist , v , ded
L,A)
14 end
15 if A is γ-complete at abs(T) then return sat
16 return unknown
Constraint Propagation step in SAT solvers. If the result of deduce is conflict
(⊥), the algorithm terminates with safe. Otherwise, the analysis enters into the
while loop at line 4 and makes a new decision by a call to decide (see Section 5.4),
which returns a new meet irreducible q. We concatenate q to the trail T. The
decision q refines the current abstract value abs(T) represented by the trail, i.e.,
abs(T · q) ⊑ abs(T). For example, a decision in the interval domain restricts the
range of intervals for variables. We set the corresponding entry in the reason
trail R to ⊤ to mark it as a decision. Here, the index of R is the size of trail T,
denoted by |T|. The procedure deduce is called next to infer new meet irreducibles
based on the current decision. The model search phase alternates between the
decision and deduction until deduce returns either sat or conflict.
If deduce returns sat, then we have found an abstract value that represents
models of the safety formula, which are counterexamples to the required safety
property, and so ACDLP returns unsafe. If deduce returns conflict, the algorithm
enters in the analyzeConflict phase (see Section 6) to learn the reason for the
conflict. There can be multiple incomparable reasons for conflict. ACDLP heuris-
tically chooses one reason C and learns it by adding it as an abstract transformer
to A. The analysis backtracks by removing the content of T up to a point where
it does not conflict with C . ACDLP then performs deductions with the learnt
transformer. If analyzeConflict returns false, then no further backtracking is
possible. Thus, the safety formula is unsatisfiable and ACDLP returns safe.
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5 Abstract Model Search for Template Polyhedra
Model search in a SAT solver has two steps: deductions, which are repeated ap-
plication of the unit rule (also called Boolean Constraint Propagation, or BCP),
to refine current partial assignments, and decisions to heuristically guess a value
for an unassigned literal. BCP can be seen to compute greatest fixed point over
the partial assignment domain [14]. Below, we present an abstract model search
procedure that computes a greatest fixed point over abstract transformers JσKD .
5.1 Parametrised Abstract Transformers
The key considerations for an abstract transformer are precision and efficiency.
A precise transformer is usually less efficient than a more imprecise one. In this
paper, we present a specialised variant of the abstract transformer to compute de-
ductions called Abstract Deduction Transformer (ADT), which is parametrised
by a given subdomain L ⊆ D . A subdomain contains a chosen subset of the
elements in D including ⊥ and ⊤ that forms a lattice. The use of a subdomain
serves two purposes – a) It allows us elegantly and flexibly to guide the de-
ductions in forward, backward or multi-way direction, which in turn affects the
analysis precision, and b) It makes deductions more efficient, for example by
performing lazy closure in template polyhedra domain. For space reasons, we
refer the reader to Appendix D for details of the lazy closure operation.
An ADT is defined formally as follows.
JσKLD (a) = a ⊓D αL({u | u ∈ γD (a), u |= σ}) (4)
For L = D , the ADT is identical to the abstract transformer defined in Eq. (2) in
Section 3. Note that a restricted subdomain makes a transformer less precise but
more efficient. Conversely, an unrestricted subdomain make a transformer more
precise, but less efficient. Therefore, we have the property JσKD
D
(a) ⊑ JσKL
D
(a).
To illustrate point (1), we give examples that demonstrate how the choice of
subdomain influences the propagation direction:
Forward Transformer. For an abstract value a = (0 ≤ y ≤ 1 ∧ 5 ≤ z), σ =
(x = y + z), and L = Itvs [{x}], we have Jx = y + zKItvs[{x}]
Itvs[{x,y,z}](a) = a ⊓ (x ≥ 6).
Assuming that the equality x = y + z originated from an assignment to x, this
performs a right-hand side (rhs) to left-hand side (lhs) propagation and hence
emulates a forward analysis.
Backward Transformer. For an abstract value a = (0 ≤ x ≤ 10∧0 ≤ y ≤ 1∧5 ≤
z), σ = (x = y + z), and L = Itvs [{y, z}], we have Jx = y + zKItvs[{y,z}]
Itvs[{x,y,z}] =
a ⊓ (z ≤ 10). This performs an lhs-to-rhs propagation and hence emulates a
backward analysis.
Multi-way Transformer. For an abstract value a = (c ≤ 1∧c ≥ 1∧x ≤ 5∧x ≥ 5),
σ = ((c = (x = y))∧ y = y+ 1) and L = Itvs [{c, x, y}], we have JσKItvs [{c,x,y}]
Itvs [{c,x,y}] =
a ⊓ (y ≤ 6∧ y ≥ 6). This performs an lhs-to-rhs propagation for c = (x = y) and
rhs to lhs propagation for y = y + 1 and hence emulates a multi-way analysis.
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5.2 Algorithm for the Deduction Phase
Algorithm 2 presents the deduction phase deduce in our abstract model search
procedure. The input to deduce is the set of abstract transformers, a prop-
agation trail (T) and a reason trail (R). Additionally, the procedure deduce
is parametrised by a propagation heuristic (HP ). We write the ADT JσKLD as
dedL in Algorithm 2. The algorithm maintains a worklist, which is a queue that
contains ADTs. The propagation heuristics provides two functions initWorklist
and updateWorklist . The order of the elements in the worklist and the sub-
domain L associated with each ADT (dedL) determine the propagation strat-
egy (forward, backward, multi-way). These two functions construct a subdo-
main (L) for dedL by calling the function MakeL such that L = MakeLD (V ),
where V are the variables that appear in dedL. The abstract value a is up-
dated upon the application of dedL in line 4 in Algorithm 2. The function
onlyNew (a) =
d
(decomp(a) \ decomp(abs(T))) is used to filter out all meet
irreducibles that are already on the trail in order to obtain only new deductions
(v) when applying the ADT (shown in line 10). Depending on the propagation
heuristics, updateWorklist adds ADTs dedL to the worklist that contain vari-
ables that appear in v , and updates the subdomains of the ADTs in the worklist
to include the variables in v (shown in line 13).
If dedL deduces ⊥, then the procedure deduce returns conflict (shown in
line 8). Otherwise, when a fixed-point is reached, i.e. the worklist is empty, we
check whether the abstract transformers A are γ-complete [14] for the current
abstract value abs(T) (shown in line 15). Intuitively, this checks whether all
concrete values in γ(abs(T)) satisfy the safety formula ϕ, where ϕ :=
∧
σ∈Σ σ
is obtained from the program transformation (as defined in Section 3.1). If it
is indeed γ-complete, then deduce returns sat. Otherwise, the algorithm returns
unknown and ACDLP makes a new decision.
5.3 Computing Lazy Closure for Template Polyhedra
An advantage of our formalism in Eq. (4) is that the closure operation for
relational domains can be computed in a lazy manner through the construc-
tion of a subdomain, L. The construction of L allows us to perform one step
of the closure operation when dedL is applied. For example, let us consider
D = Octs[{x, y, z}] and V = {y}. An octagonal inequality relates at most
two variables. Thus it is sufficient to consider the subdomain MakeLD ({y}) =
Octs [{y}]∪Octs[{x, y}]∪Octs[{y, z}], which will compute the one-step transitive
relations of y with each of the other variables. Only if any subsequent abstract
deduction transformer makes new deductions on x or z, then the next step of
the closure will be computed through the subdomain Octs[{x, z}]. Hence, an
application of each abstract deduction transformer does not compute the full
closure in the full domain, but compute only a single step of the closure in a
subdomain. This makes each deduction step more efficient but may require more
steps to reach the fixed point.
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5.4 Decisions
A decision q is a meet irreducible that refines the current abstract value abs(T),
when the result of fixed-point computation through deduction is neither a conflict
nor a satisfiable model of ϕ. A decision must always be consistent with respect to
the trail T, i.e., abs(T ·q) 6= ⊥. A new decision increases the decision level by one.
Given the current abstract value abs(T), the procedure decide in Algorithm 1
heuristically returns a meet irreducible.
For example, a decision in the interval domain can be of the form xRd where
R ∈ {≤,≥}, and d is the bound. A decision in the octagon domain can specify
relations between variables, and can be of the form ax− by ≤ d, where x and y
are variables, a, b ∈ {−1, 0, 1} are coefficients, and d is a constant. We refer the
reader to Appendix B for the details of different decision heuristics in ACDLP.
6 Abstract Conflict Analysis for Template Polyhedra
Propositional conflict analysis with FIRST-UIP [6] can be seen as abductive rea-
soning that under-approximates a set of models that do not satisfy a formula [14,
16]. Below, we present an abstract conflict analysis procedure, analyzeConflict
of Algorithm 1, that uses a domain-specific abductive transformer for effective
learning. A conflict analysis procedure involves two steps: abduction and heuris-
tic choice for generalisation. Abduction infers possible generalised reasons for a
conflict which is followed by heuristically selecting a generalisation. Below, we
define a global conflict transformer that gives a set of models that do not satisfy
a formula.
Definition 5. Given formula ϕ, an initial abstract value a and domain D,
confDϕ (a) = {u | u ∈ decomp(a) ∨ u 6|= ϕ}, that is, it adds abstract models
to the input set a, that do not satisfy ϕ.
For formula ϕ and domain D , an abstract abductive transformer, abdDϕ (a), cor-
responds to the under-approximation of the global conflict transformer, confDϕ .
For example, given a formula ϕ = {x = y + 1 && x ≥ 0}, and an interval ab-
stract element a = (y ≤ −5), conf Itvsϕ (a) = {(y ≤ −5), (y ≤ −4, x ≤ −3), (y ≤
−3, x ≤ −2), (y ≤ −2, x < 0)}. Informally, conf Itvsϕ computes the most general
set of incomparable reasons under which ϕ implies the truth of a (or ⊥ since
formula is unsatisfiable under a). Now, an abstract abductive transformer for
ϕ = {x = y+1 && x ≥ 0} is given by, abdItvsϕ (y ≤ −5) = (y ≤ −2, x < 0), which
clearly underapproximates conf Itvsϕ as well as strictly generalizes the reason for
y ≤ −5.
The main idea of abductive reasoning is to iteratively replace a singleton
assignment s in the conflict reason by a partial assignment that is sufficient to
infer s. Conflict abduction is performed by obtaining cuts through markings
in the trail T, by the application of abstract Unique Implication Point (UIP)
search algorithm [6]. Every cut is a reason for conflict. The UIP search can also
be understood through graph cutting in an Abstract Conflict Graph, which is
defined next.
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Fig. 4. Finding the Abstract UIP in the Octagon Domain
Definition 6. An Abstract Conflict Graph (ACG) is a directed acyclic graph in
which the vertices are defined by all deduced elements or a decision node and a
special conflict node (⊥) in the trail T. The edges in ACG are obtained from the
reason trail R that maps the elements in T to the abstract transformers that are
used to derive the deduced elements.
Abstract UIP Search An abstract UIP algorithm [8] traverses the trail T
starting from the conflict node and computes a cut that suffices to produce a
conflict. For example, consider a formula ϕ := {x+4=z ∧ x+z=2y ∧ z+y > 10}.
As before, the trail can be viewed to represent an ACG, shown in Fig. 4, that
records the sequence of deductions in the octagon domain that are inferred from
a decision (x≤0) for the formula ϕ. The arrows (in red) shows the relationship
between the reason trail and propagation trail in bottom of Fig. 4. For the par-
tial abstract value, a = {x ≤ 0 ∧ x + z ≤ 4 ∧ z ≤ 4}, obtained from the trail,
the result of the abstract deduction transformer is Jy = (x + z)/2KOcts(a) =
{x + y ≤ 2, y ≤ 2, y + z ≤ 6}. A conflict (⊥) is reached for the decision x≤0.
Note that there exist multiple incomparable reasons for conflict, marked as cut0
and cut1 in Fig. 4. Here, cut0 is the first UIP (node closest to conflict node).
Choosing cut0 yields a learnt clause (y + z > 6), which is obtained by negating
the reason for conflict. The abstract UIP algorithm returns a learnt transformer
AUnit , which is described next.
Learning in Template Polyhedra Domain Learning in a propositional solvers
yields an asserting clause [6] that expresses the negation of the conflict reasons.
We present a lattice-theoretic generalisation of the unit rule for template-based
abstract domains that learns a new transformer called abstract unit transformer
(AUnit). We add AUnit to the set of abstract transformers A. AUnit is a gen-
eralisation of the propositional unit rule to numerical domains. For an abstract
lattice D with complementable meet irreducibles and a set of meet irreducibles
C ⊆ D such that
d
C does not satisfy ϕ, AUnitC : D → D is formally defined
as follows.
AUnitC (a) =


⊥ if a ⊑
d
C (1)
t¯ if t ∈ C and ∀t′ ∈ C \ {t}.a ⊑ t′ (2)
⊤ otherwise (3)
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Rule (1) shows AUnit returns ⊥ since a ⊑
d
C is conflicting. Rule (2) of AUnit
infer a valid meet irreducible, which implies that C is unit. Rule (3) of AUnit
returns ⊤ which implies that the learnt clause is not asserting after backtracking.
This would prevent any new deductions from the learnt clause. Progress is then
made by decisions. An example of AUnit for C = {x ≥ 2, x ≤ 5, y ≤ 7} is given
below.
Rule 1: For a = (x ≥ 3∧x ≤ 4∧y ≥ 5∧y ≤ 6), AUnitC (a) = ⊥, since a ⊑
d
C .
Rule 2: For a = (x ≥ 3 ∧ x ≤ 4), AUnitC (a) = (y ≥ 8), since a ⊑ (2 ≤ x ≤ 5).
Rule 3: For a = (x ≥ 1 ∧ y ≤ 10), AUnitC (a) = ⊤.
Backjumping A backjumping procedure removes all the meet irreducibles from
the trail up to a decision level that restores the analysis to a non-conflicting state.
The backjumping level is defined by the meet irreducibles of the conflict clause
that is closest to the root (decision level 0) where the conflict clause is still unit.
If a conflict clause is globally unit, then the backjumping level is the root of the
search tree and analyzeConflict returns false, otherwise it returns true.
7 Experimental Results
We have implemented ACDLP for bounded safety verification of C programs.
ACDLP is implemented in C++ on top of the CPROVER [4] framework and
consists of around 9 KLOC. The template polyhedra domain is implemented
in C++ in 10 KLOC. Templates can be intervals, octagons, zones, equalities,
or restricted polyhedra. Our domain handles all C operators, including bit-
wise ones, and supports precise complementation of meet irreducibles, which
is necessary for conflict-driven learning. Our tool and benchmarks are available
at http://www.cprover.org/acdcl/.
We verified a total of 85 ANSI-C benchmarks. These are derived from: (1) the
bit-vector regression category in SV-COMP’16; (2) ANSI-C models of hardware
circuits auto-generated by v2c [24] from VIS Verilog models and opencores.org;
(3) controller code with varying loop bounds auto-generated from Simulink model
and control intensive programs with nested loops containing relational properties.
All the programs with bounded loops are completely unrolled before analysis.
We compare ACDLP with the state-of-the-art SAT-based bounded model
checker CBMC ([2], version 5.5) and a commercial static analysis tool, Astre´e
([3], version 14.10). CBMC uses MiniSAT 2.2.1 in the backend. Astre´e uses a
range of abstract domains, which includes interval, bit-field, congruence, trace
partitioning, and relational domains (octagons, polyhedra, zones, equalities, fil-
ter). To enable fair comparison using Astre´e, all bounded loops in the program
are completely unwound up to a given bound before passing to Astre´e. This
prevents Astre´e from widening loops. ACDLP is instantiated to a product of the
Booleans and the interval or octagon domain instance of template polyhedra.
ACDLP is also configured with a decision heuristic (ordered, random, activity-
based), propagation (forward, backward and multi-way), and conflict-analysis
(learning UIP, DPLL-style). The timeout for our experiments is set to 200 sec-
onds.
ACDLP versus CBMC Fig. 5 presents a comparison of the analyses using
CBMC and ACDLP. Fig. 5(a) clearly shows that the SAT based analysis made
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Fig. 6. Runtime Comparison between CBMC, Astre´e and ACDLP
significantly more decisions compared to ACDLP for all the benchmarks. The
points on the extreme right below the diagonal in Fig. 5(b) show that the num-
ber of propagations in the SAT based analysis is maximal for benchmarks that
exhibit relational behaviour. These benchmarks are solved by octagon domain
in ACDLP. We see a reduction of at least two orders of magnitude in the to-
tal number of decisions, propagations and conflicts compared to analysis using
CBMC.
Out of 85 benchmarks, SAT based analysis could prove only 26 benchmarks
without any restarts. The solver was restarted in the other 59 cases to avoid
spending too much time in “hopeless” branches. By contrast, ACDLP solved all
85 benchmarks without restarts. The runtime comparison between ACDLP and
CBMC are shown in Figure 6. ACDLP is 1.5X faster than CBMC. The superior
performance of ACDLP is attributed to the decision heuristics, which exploit
the high-level structure of the program, combined with the precise deduction by
multi-way transformer and stronger learnt clause aided by the richer abstract
domains.
ACDLP versus Astre´e To enable precise analysis using Astre´e, we manually
instrument the benchmarks with partition directives ASTREE partition control
at various control-flow joins. These directives provide external hint to Astre´e to
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guide its internal trace partition domain. Figure 6 demonstrates that Astre´e
is 2X faster than ACDLP for 37% cases (32 out of 85); but the analysis us-
ing Astre´e shows a high degree of imprecision (marked as timeout in Figure 6).
Astre´e reported 53 false alarms among 85 benchmarks. Whereas, the analysis
using ACDLP produces correct results for 81 benchmarks. ACDLP timed out
for 4 benchmarks. Clearly, ACDLP has higher precision than Astre´e. Detailed
analysis of the comparison between ACDLP, CBMC and Astre´e is presented in
Appendix A.
Our experimental evaluation suggests that ACDLP can be seen as a tech-
nique to improve the efficiency of SAT-based BMC. Additionally, ACDLP can
also be perceived as an automatic way to improve the precision of conventional
abstract interpretation over non-distributive lattices through automatic parti-
tion generation techniques such as decisions and transformer learning.
8 Related Work
The work of [17] presents a tight integration of SAT solving with interval based
arithmetic constraint solving to handle large constraint systems. Silva et al. [16]
present an abstract interpretation account of satisfiability algorithms derived
from DPLL procedures. The work of [15] is a very early instantiation of abstract
CDCL [16] as an interval-based decision procedure for programs, but in a purely
logical settings. A similar technique that lifts DPLL(T) to programs is Satisfi-
ability Modulo Path Programs (SMPP) [19]. SMPP enumerates program paths
using a SAT formula, which are then verified using abstract interpretation. The
work of [22] proposes an algorithm inspired by constraint solvers for inferring
disjunctive invariants using intervals. The lifting of CDCL to first-order theo-
ries is proposed in [11, 21, 23]. Unlike previous work that operates on a fixed
first-order lattice, ACDLP can be instantiated with different abstract domains
as well as product domains.
ACDLP is not, however, similar to abstraction refinement. ACDLP works on
a fixed abstraction. Also, transformer learning in ACDLP does not soundly over-
approximate the existing program transformers. Hence, transformer learning in
ACDLP is distinct from transformer refinement in classical CEGAR.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a general algorithmic framework for lifting the model
search and conflict analysis procedures in satisfiability solvers to program anal-
ysis. We embody these techniques in a tool, ACDLP, for automatic bounded
safety verification of C programs over a template polyhedra abstract domains.
We present an abstract model search procedure that uses a parameterised
abstract transformer to flexibly control the precision and efficiency of the deduc-
tions in the template polyhedra abstract domain. The underlying expressivity of
the abstract domain helps our decision heuristics to exploit the high-level struc-
ture of the program for making effective decisions. The abstract conflict analysis
procedure learns abstract transformers over a given template following a UIP
computation. Experimental evaluation over a range of benchmarks shows 20x
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reduction in the total number of decisions, propagations, conflicts and backtrack-
ing iterations compared to CBMC. Moreover, ACDLP is 1.5x faster than CBMC.
Compared to Astre´e, ACDLP solves twice as many benchmarks and has much
higher precision. In the future, we plan to extend our framework to unbounded
verification through invariant generation.
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Appendix
A Detailed Experimental Results
Table 3 gives a detailed comparison between CBMC version 5.5 and ACDLP.
Columns 1–4 in Table 3 contain the name of the tool, the benchmark category,
the number of lines of code (LOC), and the total number of safe and unsafe bench-
marks in the respective categories (labelled as Safe/Unsafe). The solver statistics
(Decisions, Propagations, Conflicts, Conflict Literals, Restarts) for CBMC and
ACDLP are in columns 5–9.
We classify our benchmarks into separate categories. We label the bench-
marks in bit-vector regression category from SV-COMP’16 as Bit-vector, ANSI-
C models of hardware circuits auto-generated by v2c tool as Verilog-C and
auto-generated Controller code and control-intensive benchmarks as Control-
Flow category. The total number of benchmarks in bit-vector category are 13,
Control-Flow category contains 55 benchmarks and Verilog-C category has 17
benchmarks. The timeout for our experiments is set to 200 seconds. All times in
Table 3 and Table 4 are in seconds.
The Bit-vector category contains a total of 13 benchmarks, out of which 6 are
safe and the remaining 7 are unsafe benchmarks. The benchmarks in the control-
flow category contains simple bounded loop analysis with relational properties to
more complex controller code containing nested loops with varying loop bounds.
Out of 55 benchmarks in this category, 35 are safe and 20 are unsafe. We verified
a total of 17 hardware benchmarks, which are given in Verilog RTL language.
Out of these 17 benchmarks, 10 are safe and the remaining 7 are unsafe. The
software models (in ANSI-C) for the Verilog circuits are obtained via a Verilog to
C translator tool, v2c. These software models are then fed to CBMC and ACDLP.
The hardware benchmarks include an implementation of a Instruction buffer
logic, FIFO arbiter, traffic light controller, cache coherence protocol, Dekker’s
mutual exclusion algorithm among others. The largest benchmark is the cache
coherence protocol which consists of 890 LOC and the smallest benchmark is
TicTacToe with 67 LOC. The software models of these Verilog circuits uses
several complex bit-wise logic to map hardware operations into an equivalent C
syntax. We emphasize that our implementation can handle bit-wise operations
out-of-the-box.
Safe/ Propa- Conflict
Verifier Category LOC Unsafe Decisions gations Conflicts literals Restarts
CBMC
Bit-vector 501 6/7
1011 1190 0 0 7
ACDLP 0 44 0 0 0
CBMC
Control-Flow 1387 35/20
29382 379727 4520 37160 62
ACDLP 414 6487 195 180 0
CBMC
Verilog-C 4210 10/7
131932 322707 69 349 6
ACDLP 625 8196 22 22 0
Table 3. CBMC versus ACDLP
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Verifier Category #Proved (safe/unsafe) #Inconclusive #False Positives
Astre´e
Bit-vector
5/7 0 1
ACDLP 6/7 0 0
Astee´e
Control-Flow
24/9 0 22
ACDLP 35/17 3 0
Astre´e
Verilog-C
2/4 0 11
ACDLP 9/7 1 0
Table 4. Astre´e versus ACDLP
The statistics for ACDLP in Table 3 is obtained using an ordered decision
heuristic, multi-way propagation heuristic and a first-UIP learning heuristic.
Note that the deductions using a multi-way heuristic is more precise than for-
ward or backward heuristics, but multi-way heuristic takes longer time to reach
the fixed-point. Furthermore, multi-way heuristic significantly reduces the total
number of decisions, propagations and learning iterations due to higher preci-
sion of the deductions made in the abstract domain. Overall, ACDLP reduces
the total number of decisions, propagations, conflicts and restarts by a factor
of 20X compared to CBMC.
Table 4 gives a detailed comparison between Astre´e and ACDLP. Columns 1–
5 in Table 4 gives the name of the tool, the benchmark category, the total number
of instances proved safe or unsafe (labelled as safe/unsafe), the total number of
inconclusive benchmarks and total number of false positives per category.
Table 4 shows that ACDLP solved twice more benchmarks than Astre´e. The
total number of inconclusive results in ACDLP is 4. The inconclusive results
is because of timeout. By contrast, Astre´e reports a total of 53 false positives
among 85 benchmarks. Clearly, ACDLP is more precise than Astre´e.
B Decision Heuristics in ACDLP
We have implemented several decision heuristics in ACDLP: ordered, longest-
range, random, and the activity based decision heuristic. The ordered decision
heuristic makes decisions on meet irreducibles that involve conditional variables
(variables that appear in conditional branches) first before choosing meet irre-
ducibles with numerical variables. The longest-range heuristic simply keeps track
of the bounds dl, du of matching template rows, which are row vectors c, c
′ such
that c = −c′. dl ≤ cx ≤ du, picks the one with the longest range du − dl, and
randomly returns the meet irreducible cx ≤ ⌊dl+du2 ⌋ or its complement. This en-
sures a fairness policy in selecting a variable since it guarantees that the intervals
of meet irreducibles are uniformly restricted. The random decision heuristic arbi-
trarily picks a meet irreducible for making decision. The activity based decision
heuristic is inspired by the decision heuristic used in the Berkmin SAT solver.
The activity based heuristic keeps track of the activity of meet irreducibles that
participate in conflict clauses. Based on the most active meet irreducible, ranges
are split similar to the longest-range heuristic.
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Fig. 7. Effect of Propagation Heuristics and Decision Heuristics in ACDLP
C Decisions, Propagations and Learning in ACDLP
Propagation Strategy. Fig. 7(a) presents a comparison between the forward and
multi-way propagation strategy in ACDLP. The choice of strategy influences the
total number of decisions and clause learning iterations. Hence, the propagation
strategy has a significant influence on the runtime, which can be seen in Fig. 7(a).
We did not report the performance of backward propagation strategy due to large
number of timeouts. Compared to forward propagation, the multi-way strategy
may take more iterations to reach the fixed-point, but it subsequently reduces the
total number of decisions and conflicts to prove the program. This is attributed
to the higher precision of the meet irreducibles inferred by the multi-way strategy,
which subsequently aids the decision heuristics to make better decisions.
Decision Heuristics. Fig. 7(b) shows the performance of different decision heuris-
tics in ACDLP. Note that the runtimes for all decision heuristics are obtained
using the multi-way propagation strategy. The runtimes are very close, but we
can still discern some key characteristics of these heuristics. The activity based
heuristic performs consistently well for most safe benchmarks and all bit-vector
category benchmarks. By contrast, the ordered heuristic performs better for
programs with conditional branches since it prioritises decisions on meet irre-
ducibles that appear in conditionals. The runtimes for the random heuristic are
marginally higher than the other two. This suggests that domain-specific decision
heuristics are important for ACDLP.
Learning. Learning has a significant influence on the runtime of ACDLP.We com-
pare the UIP-based learning technique with an analysis that performs classical
DPLL-style analysis. The effect of UIP computation allows ACDLP to backtrack
non-chronologically and guide the model search with a learnt transformer. But
classical DPLL-style analysis exhibits case-enumeration behaviour and could not
finish within the time bound for 20% of our benchmarks.
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D Computing Lazy Closure for Template Polyhedra
Computing the closure for relational domains, such as octagons, is expensive.
An advantage of our formalism in Eq. (4) is that the closure operation for
relational domains can be computed in a lazy manner through the construc-
tion of a subdomain. A subdomain L is constructed from domain D for a
abstract deduction transformer dedL, such that L = MakeLD(V ), where V
are variables that appears in dedL. The construction of L allows us to per-
form one step of the closure operation when dedL is applied. For example,
let us consider D = Octs[{x, y, z}] and V = {y}. An octagonal inequality
relates at most two variables. Thus it is sufficient to consider the subdomain
MakeLD ({y}) = Octs[{y}] ∪Octs [{x, y}] ∪Octs[{y, z}], which will compute the
one-step transitive relations of y with each of the other variables. Only if a ab-
stract deduction transformer subsequently makes new deductions on x or z, then
the next step of the closure will be computed through the subdomainOcts[{x, z}].
Hence, an application of abstract deduction transformer does not compute the
full closure in the full domain, but compute only a single step of the closure
in a restricted domain. This makes each deduction step more efficient but may
require more steps to reach the fixed point.
Let us demonstrate the idea of lazy closure with a concrete example. Assume
the program in the left of Figure 8. The corresponding locations are marked
L1 and L2. We analyze the program with an octagon domain (Octs), which
computes the closure in lazy manner. The lazy closure computation in octagon
domain is shown in the right of Figure 8.
Recall that a closure in octagon domain achieves a normal form by com-
puting all implied constraints among numerical variables. The closure opera-
tion is necessary to perform precise domain operations. The ACDLP analysis
in Figure 8 performs forward propagation in Octs by creating a subdomain L
for every transformer using the function MakeL. Note that the choice of sub-
domain over lhs variables of the transformers guides the analysis in forward
direction in this example. The subdomain corresponding to L1 over y is given by
Octs [{y}]∪Octs[{y, z}]. This means, only those deductions which are implied by
the domain Octs[{y}] ∪ Octs[{y, z}] can be inferred at L1. No deductions over
Octs [{y, x}] is performed at L1. Thus, we delay the deductions over {y, x} until
we encounter an abstract transformer over these variables. This does not admit
a normal form for octagonal constraints after the application of the transformer
at L1, but it makes the deduction step at L1 more efficient.
Assume that the initial abstract value (a) is a = (x = y). Then, the deduction
at L1 infers y = z. Thus, the updated abstract value is a = {x = y ∧ y = z}.
We now analyze the transformer at L2. The subdomain for L2 over variable x
(for forward propagation) is given by Octs[{x}] ∪ Octs[{x, y}] ∪ Octs[{x, z}] ∪
Octs [{x,w}]. Note that we delayed the deduction over Octs[{x, y}] at L1, but
only perform the deductions over Octs[{x, y}] at L2. This is the notion of lazy
closure computation. The new deductions at L2 are {x = z, x−w ≤ 1, x−w ≥ 1}
and the final abstract value is a = {x = y∧y = z∧x = z∧x−w ≤ 1∧x−w ≥ 1}.
Thus, the normal form over Octs{x, y, z} is only achieved at L2. However, we
do not perform deductions over Octs{w, z} at L2, which is delayed until the
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point where we encounter an abstract transformer that forces us to infer such
deductions.
C program Lazy Closure Computation
int main ( ) {
L1 : y=z ;
L2 : x=w+1;
}
L1 : MakeLD({y}) = Octs [{y}] ∪Octs [{y, z}]
New Deductions : {y = z}
Abstract Value : a = {x = y ∧ y = z}
L2 : MakeLD({x}) = Octs [{x}] ∪Octs [{x, y}] ∪Octs [{x, z}] ∪Octs [{x, w}]
New Deductions : {x = z, x− w ≤ 1, x−w ≥ 1}
Abstract Value : a = {x = y ∧ y = z ∧ x = z ∧ x− w ≤ 1 ∧ x− w ≥ 1}
Fig. 8. C Program and Lazy closure operation for Octagons
E Example Demonstrating Execution of ACDLP
We now present a step-by-step execution of the ACDLP algorithm. Figure 9
shows a Control-flow Graph of a program. The program is safe since the Error
location is unreachable along every execution of program paths. We analyze the
safety of this program using ACDLP. Fig. 10 shows an example run for the coun-
Control-Flow Graph
Error
n1
n3n4 n2
n5
n7n6
[y ≤ 20]
[y:=y+2]
y:=x * y
[y > 0]
y < 0
[y < 0]
x:=0x:=-2 x:=2
[y = 0]
Fig. 9. A Control-Flow Graph of a Program
terexample search procedure for the program in Fig.9. The elements obtained
using an overapproximate strongest postcondition transformer apost are marked
in blue in Fig. 10. Starting from ⊤, forward analysis concludes that x is be-
tween -2 and 2 from aposty:=−2 ∪ aposty=0 ∪ aposty := 2. Note that the loop
is completely unwound and all statements corresponding to the loop are collec-
tively referred to as loop. A forward fixed-point analysis (marked by apostloop)
does not yield any new information. Clearly, the analysis is not precise to infer
anything about the reachability of the error location Error. Hence, we apply a
decision by picking a meet irreducible y ≥ 2 to increase the precision of analysis.
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(Conflict)(Decision)
apostx:=2 apostloop
{x ≥ 2, x ≤ 2}
⊥y ≥ 2 {x ≥ 2, x ≤ 2} {y ≥ 4, {y ≥ 4}
aposty<0aposty=x∗y
⊤ apostx:=−2 ∪ apostx:=0 ∪ apostx:=2 apostloop {x ≥ −2; x ≤ 2}{x ≥ −2; x ≤ 2}
Fig. 10.Model Search as Downward Iteration Sequence with Decisions and Deductions
We then apply forward analysis from this decision which yields a downward it-
eration sequence as shown in lower part of Fig. 10. Forward analysis concludes
that {y ≥ 4}. This leads to conflict, marked as ⊥. Hence, the error location
Error is unreachable for this decision. The conflict analysis procedure is shown
in Figure 11. We iteratively apply the weakest precondition transformer âpre
starting from the conflict element (⊥), the result of which is shown in bold text.
For example, ̂aprey≤0(⊥) = {y > 0}; whereas the result of strongest postcondi-
tion is is {y ≥ 4}. So, we heuristically pick a generalized element a such that
{y ≥ 4} ⊑ a ⊑ {y > 0}; we pick c = {y > 0} through the application of
heuristic choice [18] (corresponds to upwards interpolation), int ↾ (y > 0, y ≥ 4),
marked in blue. Note that the loop is completely unwound and all statements
corresponding to the loop are collectively referred to as loop. We then repeat
the process marked by ̂apreloop. Subsequently, we derive a generalized reason,
{x > 0, y > 0}, that strictly generalizes the decision x >= 2. The conflict reason
{x > 0, y > 0} underapproximates set of safe traces.
Fig. 12 shows the sequence of fixed point iteration with the learned transformer
(Conflict)(Decision)
⊥
̂aprex=2(A2)
2 ≥ x ≤ 2}
A0 = {y > 0}A2 = {y > 0, x > 0}A3 = {y > 0, x > 0}
{x ≥ 2, x ≤ 2}
{x ≥ 2, x ≤ 2} ⊥
apostx:=2 apostloop
̂apreloop(A0)
A1 = {y > 0}
y ≥ 2
aposty=x∗y
{y ≥ 4, {y ≥ 4}
aposty<0
̂aprey<0(⊥)̂aprey=x∗y(A1)
int ↾ {y ≥ 4, y > 0}int ↾ {y ≥ 4, y > 0}int ↾ {y > 0, x > 0,int ↾ {y > 0, x > 0}
{y > 0}{y > 0}{y > 0,x > 0}{y > 0,x > 0}
Fig. 11. Conflict Analysis with underapproximate weakest precondition and heuristic
generalization
Transformer 
Learned (Conflict)
y ≤ 0 {x ≥ −2, x ≤ 0} {y ≥ 0} {y ≥ 0} ⊥
apostx:=−2 ∪ apostx:=0 aposty=x∗y apostloop aposty<0
Fig. 12. Downward Iteration Sequence with Learned transformer
y ≤ 0, obtained from AUnit. Clearly, this also leads to conflict. There are no
further cases to explore. Thus, the procedure terminates and returns safe.
